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This paper concerns a problem in the epistemology of logic. This problem is an analogue 
of the Benacerraf-Field problem for mathematical Pltonism. It is also an analogue of 
Mackie’s queerness argument against moral realism, at least on one way of understanding 
that argument. The problem is what I call the “Reliability Challenge” for logic. 
The purpose of this paper is not to solve this problem – although I do gesture 
toward a solution. Rather, my aim is to get clear on what exactly the problem is. It is my 
view that the nature of the reliability challenge has not been properly understood. My 
main goals here are to present the reliability challenge in its strongest possible form and 
to show why two seemingly attractive responses are unable to answer it. This will prove 
to be relevant not only to the epistemology of logic, but also to the epistemologies of 
mathematics, modality, morality, and other a priori domains. 
Let me begin by stating a few claims about logic. Certain propositions are logical 
truths. Such truths include the proposition that every walrus is a walrus and the 
proposition that if both it is raining and if it is raining then the roads will be slippery, then 
the roads will be slippery. Other propositions are logical falsehoods. Such falsehoods 
include the proposition that some walrus is not a walrus and the proposition that it is 
raining and if it is raining then the roads will beslippery, but the roads will not be 
slippery. 
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For my purposes here, I need not assume any particul  account of the nature of 
logic. In my discussion, however, I will make use of a few background assumptions. 
First, “logic,” as I use the term here, does not concern an artificial formal language but 
propositions that can be expressed in natural languge and believed by ordinary thinkers.1 
Second, I assume that propositions (and not sentences) are the primary bearers of logical 
truth and logical falsity.2 Third, I assume that logical truths are necessarily true and 
logical falsehoods are necessarily false on any reasonable (alethic) kind of necessity. 
Finally, I assume that classical logic is at least approximately correct. 
We ordinarily think that we know many logical truths. For instance, we take it 
that we know the two logical truths stated above. At first blush, this knowledge is 
unmysterious. What could be easier than knowing that every walrus is a walrus? Yet, we 
ought to be more puzzled than we are. Our logical knowledge is a significant cognitive 
achievement in at least two respects: First, we are reliable in by-and-large believing 
logical truths and disbelieving logical falsehoods. Second, our logical beliefs have a 
positive epistemic status. We are justified – or perhaps better, epistemically responsible – 
in holding many of the logical beliefs that we do. That we are reliable and that we are 
responsible are facts that need to be explained. It would be very odd to think that either is 
a brute fact, akin to a law of nature or to a mere random accident. But it is not at all clear 
how these facts are to be explained. 
The epistemology of logic thus has two main explanatory tasks – to explain how it 
is that our logical beliefs are reliable and to explain how it is that we are epistemically 
responsible in believing as we do. In this paper, I focus on the first task, that of 
explaining our reliability.3 
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For simplicity, let the term “logical propositions” tand for the logical truths and 
logical falsehoods. We can understand the claim that we are reliable about logic as the 
following thesis: The logical propositions we believe (upon reflection and discussion) are 
by-and-large true and the logical propositions we disbelieve (upon reflection and 
discussion) are by-and-large false.4 The reliability challenge for logic is the challenge of 
explaining this fact.5 
Reliability challenges are not limited to the case of logic. Given any domain about 
which we think we are reliable, there is a need to explain our reliability.6 For certain 
domains – for instance, facts concerning ordinary-sized objects in our environment – we 
are able to answer the challenge. For other domains, the challenge remains pressing. 
Significant reliability challenges arise for mathematics, morality, modality, conceptual 
truths, intuitions about thought experiments, and many other domains. 
The intuitive problem can be put as follows: We have some understanding of how 
perception can yield veridical beliefs about the external world. We possess a sketch of 
how the mechanisms underlying perception work and understand how they may yield 
true beliefs. But this explanation doesn’t extend to the cases of logic, mathematics, 
modality, and other a priori domains.7 Nor is there available any well-developed 
alternative account. We simply do not understand how we can be reliable about these 
domains, given that our beliefs were not arrived at vi  some kind of perception. 
Reliability challenges are perhaps most familiar for the cases of mathematics and 
morality. According to the Benacerraf-Field problem, athematical Platonism faces 
difficulty in explaining the reliability of our mathematical beliefs, given its claim that 
mathematical entities are abstract. 8 According to one version of Mackie’s queerness 
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argument, moral realism faces difficulty in accounting for our reliability about moral 
truths, since if objective values were to exist, they would be peculiar entities outside of 
our ken.9 
These difficulties are typically presented as generated by the ontologies of the two 
domains. But this is a mistake. The root of the trouble is not the ontology but the apparent 
objectivity of mathematics and morality.10 If mathematics, for instance, were to turn out 
not to have an ontology, but the relevant truths were nevertheless objective, our reliability 
would remain puzzling. If mathematics were to turn out to have an ontology, but the 
relevant truths were not objective – for instance, th y were somehow constituted by our 
practices – our reliability might be easily explained. The same holds true for other 
domains. For the case of logic, what gives the reliability challenge its bite is the apparent 
objectivity of logic. 
There may be several philosophically interesting notio s of objectivity.11 For the 
purpose of developing the reliability challenge for logic, the claim that logic is objective 
can best be understood as the conjunction of three eses. The first thesis is a claim about 
the content of our sentences and mental representations: 
Meaningfulness: Certain sentences and mental representations express logical 
truths and falsehoods. They are therefore both meaningful and truth-apt.12 
 
This excludes nonsense, make-believe, and mere exprssions of emotion as counting as 
objective. It provides an extremely weak requirement on the objectivity of logic. 
The second thesis is a claim about independence: 
Independence: The truth of logical truths and the falsity of logical falsehoods do 




For my purposes here, it suffices to operate with a purely intuitive understanding of this 
thesis. In my view, however, the best way to understand the independence thesis is as 
follows: The logical facts do not obtain (in whole r in part) in virtue of facts about us. 
Here, the in virtue of relation is an explanatory relation. Our thoughts, language, and 
practices are not part of what constitutively explains why the logical facts are the way 
that they are.13 
The third and final thesis is the denial of a plenitudinous view of logic: 
No Plenitude: Of the many possible different logical practices, only a few are 
correct. 
 
This thesis ensures that reliability is not a trivial accomplishment – not just any logical 
practice counts as correct. Indeed, most logical practices do not.14 
To motivate the need for the no-plenitude thesis, it may help to consider the cases 
of mathematics and morality. One answer that has been proposed to the Benacerraf-Field 
problem is roughly as follows: The domain of mathematical reality is so large and 
multifarious that no matter which consistent mathematical theories we were to accept, 
they would truly represent some portion of mathematical reality.15 This view satisfies the 
first two objectivity theses for mathematics. Yet, it is intuitively a non-objective view.16 
Similarly, consider an analogous view about morality. Suppose that there are a vast 
number of rightness properties, all on a par, so that any consistent theory of right and 
wrong will truly characterize one of them. Surely, such a view of morality should not 
count as an objective view. 
That this conception of objectivity is the appropriate one for the purpose of 
developing the reliability challenge may be motivated as follows: Suppose we are reliable 
about some a priori domain. There would seem to be only a few candidate explanations 
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of our reliability: (i) Our beliefs depend on the relevant facts; (ii) The facts depend on our 
beliefs; (iii) Both our beliefs and the facts depend on some third factor; and (iv) 
Reliability about the domain is trivial in that we ould be reliable no matter which 
practice we were to adopt.17 The a priority of the domain would seem to rule out the first 
candidate. The independence condition would seem to rule out the second. The a priority 
and independence conditions together would seem to rule out plausible versions of the 
third. The no-plenitude condition would seem to rule out the final candidate. This is what 
generates the puzzle. 
As we will see, this is an overly simplistic way to think about the challenge. But it 
provides a useful heuristic. 
The difficulty of answering the reliability challenge for logic potentially has 
significant ramifications. If we were to come to believe that there is no satisfying 
explanation of our reliability compatible with the objectivity of logic and with our 
general background views about the world, this would put pressure on our belief that 
logic is objective, on our belief that we are reliab e, or on our general background 
views.18 But giving up any of these claims would be devastating to our ordinary ways of 
thinking. Thus, there is an important explanatory challenge to answer. 
This paper will proceed as follows: In the next section, I further clarify the 
reliability challenge by motivating a shift in focus from the reliability of our beliefs to the 
reliability of our cognitive mechanisms. In section three, I consider an argument due to 
Lewis that suggests that reliability challenges are mere pseudo-problems. This yields a 
significant refinement of the challenge. Section four is devoted to considering and 
rejecting several lines of thought that suggest that an answer to the reliability challenge is 
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unneeded. In section five, I evaluate two potential responses to the reliability challenge – 
one based on rational insight and one based on the ature of concepts and concept-
possession. I also discuss the prospects of an evolutionary account. Finally, in section six, 
I discuss how the case of logic may differ from that of mathematics, modality, morality, 
and other a priori domains. 
 
2. The Reliability Challenge for Logic 
Let us try to get the reliability challenge for logic in better focus. As a first pass, the 
challenge can be understood as that of answering the following question: 
The Reliability Challenge (1): What explains our reliability about logic? That is, 
what explains the fact that the logical propositions we believe (upon reflection 
and discussion) are by-and-large true and the logical propositions we disbelieve 
(upon reflection and discussion) are by-and-large false? 
 
There is a straightforward answer to this question: We are reliable in our logical 
beliefs because we employ reliable deductive rules of inference. Let me explain. 
In order to understand how we are reliable in our lgical beliefs, it is useful to 
first examine how we come to have such beliefs. Consider some moderately complex 
logical truth, for instance, if both A and B then either B or C, substituting particular 
sentences for A, B, and C. We believe this proposition, at least upon reflection. How did 
we come to believe it? In some cases, thinkers may come to believe this truth on the basis 
of testimony – perhaps of a logic teacher or a guru. But the canonical way in which 
thinkers come to believe this truth is via a chain of reasoning, perhaps one such as the 
following: 
 Suppose both A and B. 
  So B. 
  So either B or C. 
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 So if both A and B then either B or C. 
 
In general, we believe logical truths and disbelieve logical falsehoods on the basis of 
deductive reasoning. Our logical beliefs are the outputs of deductive reasoning in cases 
where there are no initial premises.19 
What is going on when someone reasons in this way? On a simple picture, 
reasoning is the process of adding and subtracting to one’s stock of beliefs. But reasoning 
is in fact much more complex than this simple picture suggests. Reasoning may involve 
suppositions, such as in the deduction displayed above. It may involve updating the 
collection of propositions a thinker rejects, or the degree to which a proposition is 
accepted. Moreover, a thinker may engage in a line of r asoning even if the thinker 
already believes claims made along the way. So whatmay change in an inferential step is 
not what is believed, but the basis on which a belief is held. 
No matter how complex reasoning may be, it is plausible that whenever we 
rationally update our mental states, we do so via the employment of rules.20 There are 
two principal grounds for this claim. First, appealing to rules is the most promising 
strategy for explaining the difference between genuine reasoning and mere change in 
belief. Second, we are familiar with two different sorts of mistakes thinkers may make in 
their reasoning – errors of competence and errors of performance. Appealing to rules 
helps to explicate this distinction; thinkers may employ the wrong rules, or they may 
misapply the rules that they employ. 
Deductive reasoning is reasoning that involves deductive rules of inference. These 
are rules that are intimately connected to the logical concepts. It is an interesting question 
which deductive rules of inference ordinary thinkers mploy. The simple deduction above 
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fits with the view that the rules we employ resemble the rules that appear in Natural 
Deduction formulations of logic. Indeed, such formulations were developed, in part, to 
connect logic more closely with psychologically realistic patterns of inference.21 On this 
view, the deductive rules we employ include rules such as: 
 From both p and q, infer p. 
 From both p and q, infer q. 
 From p, infer either p or q. 
 From q, infer either p or q. 
 From q under the supposition p, infer if p then q. 
 
There are reasons to think that the deductive rules of inference we employ are 
much more complex than this list suggests.22 Nevertheless, it is appealing to think that we 
employ deductive rules that are closely related to the standard Natural Deduction rules, 
and in what follows I will assume that we do.23 
What, then, explains the reliability of our logical beliefs? Consider again f both A 
and B then either B or C. We believe this truth because we went through something like 
the chain of reasoning displayed above, and the transi ions involved in this reasoning 
yield truths. The transitions yield truths because the deductive rules that govern them are 
reliable. In general, we are reliable in our logical beliefs because we are reliable in our 
deductive reasoning. Our reliability about logic is a byproduct of a more basic deductive 
competence.24 
This explanation answers the question that we started out with, Reliability 
Challenge (1). But it does not fully answer the reliabi ity challenge for logic. It merely 
pushes the explanatory demand one step back. An explanation is now required of the 
reliability of our deductive reasoning. The challeng  becomes that of answering the 
following question: 
 10
The Reliability Challenge (2): What explains the reliability of our cognitive 
mechanism for deductive inference?25 
 
This is a more fundamental – and much more general – explanatory challenge. It 
concerns not only the deductive reasoning that yields logical beliefs, but deductive 
reasoning from arbitrary a priori and a posteriori premises, too. 
Reliability challenges for other domains are similar. The reliability of our 
mathematical beliefs, for example, can be explained by appeal to the reliability of the 
mechanisms underlying mathematical reasoning. The reliability of our moral beliefs can 
be explained by appeal to the reliability of the mechanisms underlying moral reasoning. 
In general, what primarily requires explanation is ot the reliability of our beliefs, but the 
reliability of the cognitive mechanisms that generat  them. 
 
3. Lewis’s Response 
To further clarify the nature of the reliability challenge for logic, it is helpful to consider 
the radical view that the challenge is a mere pseudo-problem. Such a view is suggested 
by Lewis’s discussion of mathematical and modal knowledge in On the Plurality of 
Worlds.26 In that work, Lewis argues that there is only a chllenge in explaining our 
reliability about contingent truths. For contingent truths, an account is needed of how we 
track the relevant truths. For necessary truths, in contrast, no such account is needed. 
Simply believing the relevant truths is an infallible way to get it right. As Lewis writes: 
[I]f it is a necessary truth that so-and-so, then blieving that so-and-so isan infallible 
method of being right. If what I believe is a necessary truth, then there is no 
possibility of being wrong. That is so whatever thesubject matter of the necessary 
truth and no matter how it came to be believed. (Lewis, 1986, 114–115) 
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Any residual feeling that there is something left to explain is presumably the result of 
drawing an illegitimate analogy between the necessary and the contingent.27 
Applying this line of thought to the case of logic, the idea is that since logical 
truths are necessary truths, there is no need to explain our reliability about logic. Simply 
believing the logical truths is an infallible way to get it right. 
There is something attractive about Lewis’s suggestion. There does seem to be a 
significant difference between the epistemology of the necessary and the epistemology of 
the contingent. But it is difficult to swallow the claim that there is no reliability challenge 
for necessary domains. Consider the case of a thinker who reliably believes some very 
complex logical or mathematical truths but who does not otherwise evidence any 
mathematical acumen. Surely, some explanation is needed of how this thinker is reliable. 
Similarly, consider familiar a posteriori necessary truths, such as the claim that water is 
molecular. Our coming to believe such claims was a substantial achievement, and so, 
surely, an account is needed of how it is that we got them right. 
It is widely accepted that Lewis is mistaken, and that there is a reliability 
challenge for logic, mathematics, and other necessary domains.28 However, no one has 
yet identified the central problem with Lewis’s discu sion. Identifying this problem will 
help us to clarify the nature of the reliability challenge. 
A preliminary point to make in response to Lewis is that reliability challenges do 
not apply, in the first instance, to beliefs. As we have seen, the reliability of our beliefs 
can be explained in terms of the reliability of theunderlying cognitive mechanisms that 
generate them. The challenge, rather, is to explain the reliability of these mechanisms. 
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What is it to explain the reliability of a cognitive mechanism? There is an 
important distinction that ought to be drawn here, one that seems to have been largely 
overlooked. Namely, there are two distinct explanatory demands concerning the 
reliability of a cognitive mechanism. This contrast is perhaps easiest to illustrate for the 
case of visual perception. 
The first demand is to explain how our visual mechanism works such that it is 
reliable. A sketch of the answer to this question is known. There is a complex psycho-
physical story that explains the workings of our visual system. It explains how certain 
inputs – stimulations of our optic nerve – lead to the production of certain outputs – 
representations of the world. Another complex physical story explains how photons 
interact with objects and then come to stimulate our optic nerve. When these stories are 
put together, they entail that beliefs formed on the basis of visual perception are reliable 
indicators of the state of the external world, at le st in environments like ours. This 
explains why our visual mechanism is reliable. 
This explanation, however, does not explain all there is to explain. There is also 
the question of how it is that we have a reliable visual mechanism. Here, too, a sketch of 
the answer is known: We have a reliable visual mechanism because, very roughly, it 
conferred a heritable survival or reproductive advantage on our ancestors to correctly 
represent their environment using vision. 
In general, there are two distinct questions concerning the reliability of any 
cognitive mechanism. For the case of deductive infere ce, they can be put as follows: 
The Operational Question: How does our cognitive mechanism for deductive 
inference work such that it is reliable? 
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The Etiological Question: How is it that we have a cognitive mechanism for 
deductive inference that is reliable? 29 
 
These two questions ought not to be identified with the question of how the relevant 
cognitive mechanism works and the question of how we came to have it. Explaining how 
a mechanism works or how we came to have it is neither necessary nor sufficient to 
explain its reliability in either of the two senses. 
To fully answer the reliability challenge for logic, satisfying answers to both the 
operational and etiological questions must be provided. At a minimum, what’s required 
are sketches of plausible answers. An inability to sketch a plausible answer to one of the 
two questions would put pressure on the claim that our deductive mechanism is reliable, 
the claim that logic is objective, or on our general background views of the world. And if 
we had reason to think that a satisfying answer was impossible, our epistemic situation 
would be worse still. 
Let’s examine these two questions in turn. Consider first the operational question. 
To answer the analogous question for the case of vision, a complex causal story must be 
provided, one that explains how we track the relevant empirical facts. By analogy, one 
might think that a causal tracking story must be provided for the case of deductive 
inference, too. But this would be a mistake. A simpler kind of explanation suffices. Our 
deductive mechanism works via the employment of deductive rules of inference. The 
mechanism is reliable because the deductive rules we employ are necessarily truth-
preserving. That’s all that needs to be said; no causal interaction with the environment or 
with some mysterious realm of logical facts need be invoked.30 
Now consider the etiological question. This question is not subject to so simple a 
response. There was certainly no guarantee that we would come to have reliable 
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deductive rules. To answer this question, a non-trivial account is required. This is the 
crux of the reliability challenge for logic. 
The cases of mathematics, modality, and morality are similar. For each of these 
domains there is a straightforward way to answer th operational question: Our cognitive 
mechanisms are reliable because they involve the employ ent of necessarily truth-
preserving rules. The pressing challenge is that of nswering the etiological question. 
Indeed, this challenge generalizes further still. Etiological challenges can be 
raised for the cognitive mechanisms involved in empirical reasoning, perhaps most 
notably, the cognitive mechanisms governing our inductive practices and the cognitive 
mechanisms governing our applications of concepts. For each of these cognitive tasks, 
there is the question of how it is that we possess r liable mechanisms. 
We are now in a better position to evaluate Lewis’s discussion. Lewis is correct in 
his claim that the reliability challenge for mathematics, modality, and related domains is 
subject to a straightforward response, so long as the challenge is construed to be that of 
answering the operational question.31 Lewis is mistaken in his claim that a non-trivial 
account is unneeded. There remains the challenge of answering the etiological question 
for each of these domains. In particular, for the case of logic, it must be explained how it 
is that we employ reliable deductive rules of inference. 
 
4. Is an Explanation Really Needed? 
Now that we have a better fix on the nature of the reliability challenge for logic, it is time 
to examine ways in which this explanatory demand might be resisted. There are several 
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lines of thought that suggest that an explanation of our reliability is unneeded or is easy to 
provide. The purpose of this section is to show that t ese lines of thought are mistaken. 
One might think that an answer to the reliability challenge is unneeded. After all, 
thinkers can gain knowledge of their surroundings via visual perception despite being 
wholly ignorant of how vision works or how they came to have a reliable visual faculty. 
Indeed, ancient peoples had no real understanding of visi n but nevertheless were able to 
rely upon it to gain knowledge about the world. Thus, it might be concluded that the cost 
of failing to answer a reliability challenge is extremely low. 
In general, failing to possess an explanation of the reliability of a cognitive 
mechanism is not terribly worrisome. What would be worrisome is if we had compelling 
reason to suspect that there is no satisfying explanation to be had. To illustrate this, 
consider Field’s example of someone who claims that their beliefs about the daily events 
in a remote village in Nepal are by-and-large true.32 Field argues that if we had good 
reason to doubt that there is a mechanism by which t s could be the case, we should be 
very suspicious of the claim. There is a natural second condition: If we had good reason 
to doubt that there is a satisfying explanation of how it is the thinker came to have such a 
reliable mechanism, we should also be suspicious of the claim. In general, reason to 
doubt that there is a satisfying answer to the operational or etiological question for an 
(apparently) objective domain puts pressure on our ove all view of the world. 
At least prima facie, there is compelling reason to doubt that there is a satisfying 
answer to the etiological question for the cases of logic, mathematics, morality, modality, 
and other a priori domains. Each of these domains is plausibly objectiv . We seem to be 
reliable about each of these domains. But it is difficult to envision satisfying accounts of 
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how it is that we have reliable cognitive mechanisms for reasoning about these domains. 
Explanations of how it is that we have reliable cognitive mechanisms for reasoning about 
these domains – or at the very least, sketches of such explanations – are thus sorely 
needed. 
There is a second line of thought that suggests tha an explanation of our 
reliability about logic may be unneeded. Not every fact requires explanation. There are, 
after all, brute facts. Why couldn’t we simply claim that it is a brute fact that we have a 
reliable cognitive mechanism for deductive inference? Wouldn’t this be an acceptable 
answer to the etiological question for logic? 
Brute facts come in two general kinds – fundamental laws and mere accidents. 
The former class plausibly includes laws of physics and metaphysics (if such there be). 
The latter class plausibly includes the initial conditions of the universe as well as random 
phenomena such as the exact timing of events of radioactive decay. 
Our possession of a reliable deductive mechanism is not a plausible candidate for 
being a fundamental law. It would be strange to claim that it is a fundamental law that 
certain of our mental processes are truth-conducive. We don’t think that there are 
fundamental laws in psychology or that such laws can require that our reasoning be 
reliable. 
Our possession of a reliable deductive mechanism is also not a plausible candidate 
for being merely an accident. The reason is that our p ssession of a reliable deductive 
mechanism is a striking fact.33 It “calls out” for explanation. Ceteris paribus, it is a cost 
of a theory if it treats striking phenomena (within the domain of the theory) as merely 
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accidental or otherwise unexplained. So it is a significant cost of a view if our possession 
of a reliable cognitive mechanism is left unexplained. 
There is a further reason why it would be unsatisfying to claim that our possession 
of a reliable deductive mechanism is merely an accident. If it was accidental that we 
came to have a reliable deductive mechanism, it was pre umably highly unlikely for us to 
have ended up with a reliable mechanism; there are far more ways to be unreliable than to 
be reliable. Accepting that our reliability came about by accident would therefore put 
pressure on our overall view of the world. 
A third line of thought suggests that the reliability challenge for logic can, at least 
in principle, be easily answered. Presumably, there is some causal story that explains why 
we employ the particular deductive rules of inference that we do. It is a necessary feature 
of these rules that they are truth-preserving. So, the thought goes, the causal story will 
explain why it is that we employ reliable deductive rules. It will answer the etiological 
question for logic.34 
The trouble with this line of thought is that explanation is not closed under 
necessary consequence – or even logical entailment. For instance, suppose it were true 
that every day in March, the number of people who took the New York subway was a 
prime number. Suppose we could provide an elaborate explanation of why various people 
did (or did not) take the subway on particular days in March. Even though this 
explanation would entail that a prime number of peopl  took the subway each day in 
March, it would not explain this fact. The fact that there was always a prime number of 
people would remain mysterious.35 
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Analogously, an explanation of why it is that we employ particular deductive 
rules would not per se explain why it is that we employ reliable deductive rules. The 
explanation of our employment of the particular rules would presumably have nothing to 
do with their reliability. So the fact that we employ reliable rules would remain 
mysterious. 
There is a final line of thought worth discussing. The idea is that deductive 
reasoning is epistemically special in that there is simply no room for the doubt that our 
deductive mechanism is unreliable. Thus, the reliability challenge could not undermine 
our logical beliefs. So there is no need to answer th  reliability challenge for the 
particular case of logic. 
There are several grounds for the claim that deductive reasoning is special in this 
way. The first is that there is reason to think that we cannot rationally have less than full 
confidence in our fundamental rules of reasoning. We could rationally have less than full 
confidence in some fundamental rule only if our fundamental rules recommended that we 
not fully trust it (given the appropriate input beliefs). In such a situation, our epistemic 
system would make two incompatible recommendations: It would (implicitly) 
recommend employing the rule and it would (explicitly) recommend not fully trusting it. 
It is incoherent for a thinker’s epistemic system to issue such incompatible 
recommendations. Therefore, this line of thought goes, it is impossible for a thinker to 
mistrust one of their fundamental rules. Insofar as our deductive rules of inference are 
among our fundamental rules of reasoning, there is no room for doubting their 
reliability.36 
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The second ground for thinking that deductive reasoning is epistemically special 
stems from the thought that any argument against the reliability of our deductive rules 
would have to rely (at some stage) on a deductive inference. Such an argument would 
therefore be self-undermining. It would be incapable of being rationally persuasive. 
The third and final ground is simply this: It is difficult to take seriously the claim 
that a philosophical argument could challenge the reliability of a simple deductive 
inference, say the inference from a conjunction to one of its conjuncts. The reliability of 
such an inference is much more certain than any philosophical argument could be.37 
Perhaps deductive reasoning s special in this way. Perhaps the reliability of our
deductive mechanisms cannot seriously be in question.38 Even supposing that this is so, it 
does not show that an answer to the reliability challenge for logic is unneeded. Even if 
there is no room to doubt our reliability, that we ar  reliable is a striking fact. It calls out 
for explanation. Any reason to suspect that there isn’t an explanation generates a tension 
in our overall view of the world. There is pressure to alleviate this tension by doing at 
least one of the following things: (i) giving up the claim that we are reliable; (ii) giving 
up the claim that logic is objective; or (iii) giving up some of our general background 
views. Even if it is rationally impossible to reject the claim that we are reliable, there 
remains the possibility of rejecting the objectivity claim or some of our background 
views. And even if there is not all-things-considered eason to give up any of these views, 
in the absence of a response to the reliability challenge, an uncomfortable tension in our 
overall view of the world would remain. 
 
5. Candidate Explanations 
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The reliability challenge for logic is pressing. How might it be answered? So far as I can 
tell, there are only three proposals that are initially plausible – one involving a faculty of 
rational insight, one involving the nature of concepts and concept-possession, and one 
involving evolution. Let us examine each of these proposals in turn.39 
 
Rational Insight 
One view is that our reliability about deductive inference can be explained by appeal to a 
kind of rational insight. The idea is that we have  cognitive faculty broadly analogous to 
perception by which we “see” that certain deductive inf rences are good, or that certain 
propositions ought to be accepted, or something similar.40 
There are two familiar criticisms of rational insight-based views.41 First, there is 
no independent evidence that we have a faculty of rational insight. While it is plausible 
that we have mental states such as intuitions or “intellectual seemings,” these are best 
understood as felt inclinations to believe rather tan the products of a distinctive 
cognitive faculty.42 Second, the mechanism behind rational insight is very mysterious. If 
rational insight is understood on the model of vision, our logical beliefs or deductive 
inferences would have to be caused by whatever it is that we have rational insight into. 
No plausible causal story of this sort has ever been developed. And no one has come up 
with a coherent alternative model. 
But there is a still more serious problem with an appeal to rational insight, at least 
in the current context. Namely, appeal to a faculty of rational insight is of no help 
whatsoever in answering the etiological question for deductive inference. As I argued 
above, there is a straightforward explanation of how our deductive mechanism works 
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such that it is reliable. What requires explanation, rather, is how it is that we have a 
reliable mechanism. Appealing to a faculty of rational insight does nothing to meet this 
challenge. If anything, it increases its difficulty, since an explanation is then owed of how 
it is that we have a reliable faculty of rational insight. No such explanation seems 
forthcoming. 
Appealing to a faculty of rational insight thus seems impotent to answer the 
reliability challenge for any domain. 
 
Concept-Constitution 
A second proposal is that our deductive reliability can be explained purely by virtue of 
the nature of concepts and concept-possession.43 This suggestion involves two central 
ideas. 
The first idea is that the deductive rules we employ help to constitute the 
meanings of the logical concepts we possess in the following sense: to fully master these 
concepts, a thinker must employ the rules.44 For instance, to possess the concept of 
conjunction, thinkers must employ the rule: from both p and q, infer q. This view is thus 
committed to a version of Conceptual Role Semantics for the logical concepts.45 
The second idea is that the semantic values of logical concepts are assigned in 
such a way as to ensure that their constitutive ruls are necessarily truth-preserving. In 
other words, the meaning of a logical concept is assigned so as to make its constitutive 
rules reliable. 
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Taking these two ideas together, we have a straightforward explanation of how it 
is that we employ reliable deductive rules: The deductive rules we employ are concept-
constituting, and thus are guaranteed to be reliabl. 
More generally, the strategy of explanation is as follows: Certain rules we employ 
are constitutive of genuine concepts that we possess. The semantic values of genuine 
concepts are assigned in such a way as to make their constitutive rules reliable. This 
explains how it is that we employ reliable rules. 
This view deserves serious consideration. But there is a significant problem with 
it, one that shows that it cannot fully answer the reliability challenge. 
We can approach this problem by noting two general facts about concepts, 
assuming that some version of Conceptual Role Semantics is true. The first fact is that 
not every conceptual role – that is, not every package of rules involving a term in the 
mental lexicon – is constitutive of a genuine concept. 
For an extreme case, consider Prior’s example of “tonk”.46 The conceptual role 
governing this term is as follows: 
From p, infer p tonk q. 
From p tonk q, infer q. 
 
It is very plausible that this conceptual role does not constitute a genuine concept. We do 
not understand what the word “tonk” means. (“Tonk” can only sensibly be mentioned and 
not used.) We do not understand what it would be to have tonk-ish thoughts. 
For “tonk”, there are several candidate explanations f why it does not stand for a 
genuine concept – for instance, it trivializes any conceptual practice to which it is added. 
But there are also other, less extreme examples of the same phenomenon that are more 
difficult to explain. Consider the conceptual role f any logical concept modified by 
 23
adding some ad hoc restriction.47 For instance, consider the standard conceptual role for 
conjunction with the added restriction that one of its elimination rules (say, from p and q, 
infer q) only applies to sentences with a prime number of singular terms. This modified 
bundle of rules does not correspond to a genuine cocept – we have no idea how to 
understand the corresponding term. Indeed, most conceptual roles fail to correspond to 
genuine concepts.48 
The second general fact about concepts is that not every genuine concept has 
reliable constitutive rules. The most striking examples of this are pejorative concepts and 
other “thick” normative concepts that involve false pr suppositions. Consider, for 
instance, Dummett’s example of the xenophobic concept boche.49 “Boche” was a 
derogatory term used during World War I by French soldiers to refer to Germans. (I don’t 
use a contemporary racist term for the obvious reasons.) Plausibly, the constitutive rules 
for boche are something like the following:50 
From so-and-so is German, infer so-and-so is a boche. 
From so-and-so is a boche, infer so-and-so is brutish and uncivilized. 
 
Racist and xenophobic concepts like boche plausibly count as genuine concepts; 
surely, thinkers have had thoughts involving them. But no matter which semantic value is 
assigned to boche, its constitutive rules do not preserve truth. By employing these rules, 
thinkers can infer that arbitrary Germans are brutish and uncivilized. The rules are thus 
grossly unreliable. 
There are many other plausible examples of genuine co cepts with unreliable 
constitutive rules. For instance, there are mathematical concepts with inconsistent 
constitutive rules, such as the naïve concept of set, th  naïve concept of area (as applied 
to arbitrary subsets of the plane), and the naïve concept of probability (which involves 
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commitments to countable additivity as well as to the claim that there are uniform 
probability distributions on denumerable sets). There are examples of physical concepts, 
such as the intuitive concept of temperature and the Newtonian concept of mass. There 
are examples of semantic concepts, such as Frege’s concept of an extension. Finally, 
there may even be examples from logic. For example, some intuitionists claim that the 
classical concept of negation has incoherent constitutive rules. And if truth is a logical 
concept, the liar paradox demonstrates that the naïve concept of truth is a logical concept 
with inconsistent constitutive rules. 
 The second general fact about concepts already shows that there is something 
wrong with the proposed answer to the reliability challenge: The semantic principle it 
relies upon is false. The semantic values of genuine concepts are not always assigned in 
such a way as to make their constitutive rules reliable. To be extensionally adequate, the 
semantic principle must somehow be restricted. And this restriction had better not be ad
hoc and unmotivated. It is not clear what plausibly can be said here.51 
There is a still more serious issue. Each of the two general facts entails that not 
every conceptual role corresponds to a genuine concept with reliable constitutive rules. 
Indeed, most conceptual roles do not. 
This should not be a surprise; for the case of logic, it follows from our assumption 
that logic is objective. In particular, it follows from the no-plenitude claim about logic. 
Only a small number of logical practices are correct, and so very many conceptual roles 
for logical constants fail to correspond to genuine concepts with reliable constitutive 
rules. 
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This result has a significant ramification. Namely, the proposed solution to the 
reliability challenge provides (at best) a very partial explanation of our reliability. 
Suppose that it turns out that certain conceptual roles – call them the “good roles” – are 
guaranteed by the principles of semantics to correspond to genuine concepts with reliable 
constitutive rules. The concept-constitution explanation can explain how it is that our 
deductive rules are reliable given that they help to constitute good conceptual roles. But 
an explanation is still owed of how it is that we have good conceptual roles. This is a 
significant challenge in its own right. To accommodate the two general facts about 
concepts presented above, as well as the no-plenitud  thesis, the restriction to good roles 
must be a very significant restriction. So the proposed explanation of our reliability 
cannot provide the entire story. 
The moral, then, is this: There are significant difficulties in getting a concept-
constitution account of reliability to work. Moreover, even if these difficulties can be 
resolved, the reliability challenge for logic will not fully be answered. 
 
Evolution 
Where does this leave us? The only apparent remaining strategy is to appeal to some kind 
of evolutionary account. In what follows, I’ll focus on evolution by natural selection. But 
my discussion will apply more generally. In particular, it will apply to other mechanisms 
that involve selection including, for example, certain forms of cultural evolution. 
On the most straightforward evolutionary explanation of how we came to employ 
reliable deductive rules, our ancestors were selected for employing reliable deductive 
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rules – a heritable trait. This explains how it is that we, their descendants, came to 
employ reliable deductive rules.52 
I believe that an explanation of this general kind will ultimately turn out to be 
correct. At the very least, it is the most promising avenue available. But it is important to 
note that such an approach faces significant difficulties. There are several reasons to think 
that evolutionary accounts cannot even in principle explain how we came to employ 
reliable deductive rules. 
Here are some of the most pressing concerns: (i) Even if evolutionary accounts 
can explain why it is that we have useful cognitive m chanisms, they cannot explain why 
it is that we have highly reliable cognitive mechanisms; (ii) Since engaging in deductive 
reasoning does not yield new information about the world, there could not have been any 
evolutionary advantage in so doing; (iii) Even if evolutionary accounts can explain how it 
is that we employ deductive rules that are actually truth-preserving concerning a narrow 
range of simple propositions – food, danger, shelter, reproduction, and so on – they seem 
unable to explain the full extent of our reliability. For example, our deductive rules 
preserve truth when applied to propositions of arbitrary complexity. They preserve truth 
when applied to propositions with arbitrary subject matters. And they necessarily 
preserve truth. It is difficult to see how there could be any selection pressure for the 
employment of rules with these features. 
I believe that there are answers to each of these concerns. In answer to the first 
objection, possessing highly reliable general-purpose reasoning mechanisms is useful for 
survival-enhancing tasks such as problem solving and planning for future contingencies. 
In answer to the second objection, the evolutionary advantage of engaging in deductive 
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reasoning is presumably not that it provides new information about the world, but that it 
enables thinkers to convert information into a more usable form. In answer to the third 
objection, the explanation of why we employ deductive rules that are necessarily truth-
preserving when applied to propositions of arbitrary complexity and with arbitrary 
subject matters is presumably that this is a byproduct of the trait for which our ancestors 
were really selected – employing an efficient cognitive mechanism that is truth-
preserving for a limited range of propositions. But spelling out the details requires a very 
long story.53 
In the remainder of this paper, I would like to discu s one other objection, since 
this will lead to a final refinement of the reliability challenge. The objection is that 
evolutionary accounts can only explain why a particular trait predominates in a 
population and not why particular individuals have th traits that they do. It is a striking 
fact that particular individuals have reliable mechanisms, and so evolutionary accounts 
seem incapable of explaining everything that needs to be explained. 
To illustrate this worry, it is helpful to consider a toy example. Suppose that there 
is a bag containing many different colored marbles. Someone (perhaps imperfectly) 
selects the blue marbles, so that most of the blue ones are retained and most of the rest 
are thrown out. To make the example more fanciful, we can imagine that the marbles 
periodically reproduce, with each baby marble having the same color as its parent. 
If asked why most of the current population of marbles is blue, one can easily 
provide an explanation involving selection: There wre originally marbles of many 
different colors, the blue ones were selected, and they passed on their color to their 
descendants. In contrast, the explanation of why some particular marble is blue does not 
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involve selection: The marble is blue because it had a blue parent and blueness is 
hereditary. 
This example concerns artificial selection and not natural selection. Yet, the point 
generalizes. Natural selection can explain why organisms with a phenotypic trait came to 
predominate in a population. It cannot explain why a particular organism has the trait in 
question.54 The explanation of this latter fact depends on other considerations, namely 
heredity and random mutation. 
This feature of selection has an important consequence for the case of interest 
here – where the phenotypic trait is that of employing a reliable deductive rule. Consider 
some particular thinker – Bob – who employs a reliable deductive rule. Assuming an 
evolutionary account, the explanation of why Bob employs the rule in question does not 
involve selection, but rather heredity and mutation. It is irrelevant to this explanation that 
the rule is reliable. That Bob employs a reliable rul  is merely an accident. If it was not 
for the occurrence of some highly chancy events, Bob w uld not have employed a 
reliable rule. 
This is what motivates the objection to evolutionary responses to the reliability 
challenge. It seems plausible that to fully respond to the reliability challenge, we must 
both (i) provide a satisfying explanation of why the population primarily includes 
thinkers who employ reliable deductive rules and (ii) provide a satisfying explanation of 
why particular thinkers employ reliable rules. Even if an evolutionary account can satisfy 
the first constraint, it cannot satisfy the second. And it would be highly unsatisfying to be 
forced to claim that it was merely a random accident that each individual thinker employs 
reliable deductive rules. Or so goes the objection. 
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While this objection is initially compelling, it is ultimately misguided. The 
striking fact in need of explanation is the population-level fact: Our population primarily 
includes thinkers who employ reliable deductive rules. That a particular individual 
employs reliable deductive rules is not nearly as striking or in need of explanation. 
To see this, it may help to think about a different scenario. Suppose that there was 
a vast population of heterogeneous thinkers, each employing a different set of inferential 
rules. Suppose that very few of these thinkers employed reliable deductive rules. 
Suppose, in particular, that the number of such thinkers was roughly what one would 
expect if the inferential rules were distributed by some kind of random process. If the 
reliable individuals had no other striking propertis n common, we would not think that 
their reliability was particularly in need of explanation. Nor would we find it troubling if 
it turned out to be merely an accident that those particular individuals were reliable. 
The correct response to the objection, then, is to concede that evolutionary 
explanations can only explain population-level facts. But that is all they need to explain. 
All that is needed is for there to be an answer to the following question: 
The Reliability Challenge (3): How is it that our population predominately 
includes thinkers with reliable cognitive mechanisms for deductive inference? 
 
This is the right way to understand the reliability challenge for logic. This is the crux of 
the reliability challenge, whether or not an evoluti nary explanation can ultimately be 
made to work. 
  
6. Conclusion 
Let’s take stock. As we have seen, the reliability challenge for a domain can be 
understood as the challenge of explaining (i) how it is that the relevant cognitive 
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mechanisms work such that they are reliable; and (ii) how it is that we have reliable 
cognitive mechanisms. If we had good reason to doubt that there were plausible 
explanations, this would put pressure on the claim that we are reliable about the domain, 
the claim that the domain is objective, or on our general background views about the 
world. For the cases of logic, mathematics, modality, and other a priori domains, there is 
a straightforward answer to the first part of the callenge. Our cognitive mechanisms are 
reliable because they depend on the employment of necessarily truth-preserving rules. 
However, as we have seen, there is no straightforward answer to the second part of the 
challenge. Indeed, two seemingly attractive responses – appealing to rational insight and 
appealing to the nature of concept possession – fail to meet the challenge. 
For the case of logic, there is a promising avenue to pursue – namely, an 
evolutionary approach to explaining our reliability. This approach faces some significant 
difficulties, but they are difficulties that I think can be overcome. 
What about other a priori domains, for instance mathematics, modality, and 
morality? Here, the prospects of an evolutionary approach are less promising. 
For the case of mathematics, there may be an evolutionary explanation of how we 
came to possess particular mathematical concepts – for instance, the concepts shape and 
number. There may also be an evolutionary explanation of how we came to have 
consistent mathematical theories; there was presumably some evolutionary pressure to 
avoid inconsistency. (Indeed, there was presumably some pressure to avoid theories that 
are not conservative extensions of our non-mathematical theories and practices.) But 
assuming that mathematics is objective, consistency (or conservativeness) does not 
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suffice for truth.55 So it is extremely difficult to see how evolution could explain how we 
ended up with true mathematical theories. 
One way to close this gap would be to adopt a plenitudinous view of 
mathematics.56 For instance, one could claim that mathematical reality is so large and 
multifarious that any consistent mathematical theory truly describes some portion of it. 
Adopting this view has a serious cost; it requires giving up on the objectivity of 
mathematics. Indeed, while a plenitudinous view is intuitively plausible for certain 
branches of mathematics – for instance, abstract algebra – it is not very plausible for 
others – for instance, arithmetic and set theory. We have strong intuitions of objectivity 
concerning the natural numbers and (to a lesser extnt) the sets. Arithmetic seems special; 
we don’t think that it is just another arbitrary mathematical theory on a par with very 
many others. 
For the case of alethic modality, a broadly evolutinary story may again have a 
partial role to play. On a now popular view, our reliability in reasoning about necessity 
and possibility is a side effect of our reliability n reasoning with counterfactuals.57 
Supposing that this is correct, evolution may help to explain the reliability of some of our 
modal reasoning. It may help to explain how we reason correctly about counterfactuals 
concerning certain ways the world might have been – namely, the nearby, “live” 
possibilities. It is clearly advantageous, for instance, for a thinker to be able to reason 
about what he could do if a predator were approaching. Yet, additional theoretical 
resources are needed to explain the full extent of our reliability. One worry here is that in 
attributing necessity to a proposition, a thinker claims that the proposition would have 
been true even if the world were radically different. It is difficult to see how there could 
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have been any evolutionary pressure to reason reliably about radically different possible 
worlds.58 A second, related, worry concerns possibility: It is difficult to see how there 
could have been any evolutionary pressure to correctly identify which of the many 
descriptions of outlandish scenarios describe genuine metaphysical possibilities. 
In response to these concerns, there are two initially promising options that may 
be pursued. The first option is to adopt a non-objectiv  view of necessity and possibility. 
For example, one could adopt a plenitudinous view of m dality or a view on which our 
practices somehow constitute the modal facts. The second option is to claim that our 
reliability about attributions of necessity and possibility is a byproduct of some other 
cognitive abilities that were evolutionarily advantgeous, such as our ability to reason 
about live possibilities. Yet, each of these options is problematic. It is difficult to state a 
non-objective view of necessity and possibility without relying on a modal operator – for 
instance, in specifying which modal theories correctly describe portions of the 
plenitudinous modal reality or in specifying which practices can generate modal facts. It 
is also difficult to see how our reliability about radically different possible worlds could 
be a byproduct of our reliability about live possibilities. 
Finally, consider the case of morality. This is, perhaps, the most troublesome 
case. It is difficult to see how an evolutionary story can answer the reliability challenge 
for morality. The trouble is that the connection between evolutionary fitness and correctly 
reasoning about morality seems very tenuous. Assuming an objective view of morality, it 
is difficult to see why there would be any evolutionary pressure to have true moral beliefs 
or to reason correctly about moral issues.59 A natural suggestion to make is that acting in 
moral ways is conducive to survival and flourishing.60 But it is not clear that this is so; we 
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are familiar with numerous ways in which acting morally can hinder the pursuit of our 
projects. 
The prospects for an evolutionary answer to the reliability challenges for 
mathematics, modality, and morality thus seem mixed. This suggests that we should draw 
three general morals. First, there may not be a unified answer to the reliability challenge 
across a priori domains. The explanation of our reliability about logic, for example, may 
be very different from the explanation of our reliability about mathematics.61 Second, the 
epistemology of logic may be in better shape than te epistemology of other a priori 





1 Of course, there are logical truths that are too complex to be easily expressed in natural 
language or believed by ordinary thinkers. 
2 Propositions here must be understood to be fine-grained. That is, there can be distinct 
logically equivalent propositions. It would serve my purposes equally well to rely on a 
framework in which the primary bearers of logical truth and logical falsity are sentences, 
so long as sentences are (in part) semantically individuated. 
3 See Schechter and Enoch (2006) and Enoch and Schechter (2008) for discussion of the 
challenge of explaining our epistemic responsibility. 
4 This characterization of our reliability about logic echoes the characterization of our 
reliability about mathematics found in Field (1989). Thanks to Paul Boghossian for 
helpful discussion. Additional hedges may be needed for a correct statement of our 
reliability. If so, the reader should take them to be implicit. The characterization of our 
reliability might also be strengthened by adding a partial converse: We believe most 
simple logical truths and disbelieve most simple logical falsehoods (upon reflection and 
discussion), on some intuitive notion of simplicity. 
5 This way of stating the reliability challenge for l gic is somewhat artificial. A more 
natural formulation will emerge below. 
 Hale (1994) presents a reliability challenge for logic. But he does not view the 
challenge as worrisome. Indeed, he argues that the existence of a reliability challenge for 
logic shows that the analogous challenge for mathematics is not serious. Field (2005) 




6 The reliability challenge for a domain can be thought of as a part of the general 
“Integration Challenge” of reconciling the metaphysics and epistemology of the domain, 
as presented in Peacocke (1999). 
7 Those skeptical that there is a well-behaved distinction between the a priori and the a 
posteriori, such as Williamson (2008), can understand the genral challenge in terms of 
the class of armchair propositions – those propositions that can be known from the 
armchair. 
8 See the introduction and title essay of Field (1989). See Benacerraf (1973) for an 
influential precursor. 
9 See Mackie (1977), page 38. Mackie’s argument is often presented as though it relies 
purely on metaphysical considerations. But he emphasizes that an important strand of his 
argument is epistemic. Mackie’s discussion is stated in terms of the difficulties of 
explaining moral knowledge. So it is unclear whether he thinks the issue primarily 
concerns the descriptive property of reliability or a normative property such as 
justification. 
 Enoch (2010) presents a version of the reliability challenge for the normative realm. 
Street (2006) can be understood as presenting a reliability challenge for morality. 
10 This is perhaps part of what Kreisel meant by his famous dictum that the central 
problem in the philosophy of mathematics is not the existence of mathematical objects 
but the objectivity of mathematical discourse. Kreisel’s discussion of objectivity is 
scattered throughout his writings. For an example, se  Kreisel (1958), page 138. 
11 See Wright (1992). 
12 This is a variant of the first component of “minimal realism” in Rosen (1994), page 
280. 
13 To use the terminology of Fine (2001), our thoughts, language, and social practices do 
not partly ground the logical facts. See Jenkins (2008), chapter one, for the proposal that 
realism should in general be understood in constitutive terms. 
14 The no-plenitude thesis rules out the claim that every non-explosive logical practice is 
correct. (A logic is explosive if every proposition logically follows from any proposition.) 
The no-plenitude thesis also rules out the logical f tionalism of Akiba (2000), according 
to which any logical practice is correct so long as it i  conservative over the atomic facts 
and the non-logical entailment relations among atomic facts. 
 The no-plenitude thesis does not obviously rule out the logical pluralism of Beall and 
Restall (2006). On their view, there is a single set of logical connectives and a single set 
of true object-level sentences (that is, sentences that do not contain metalogical 
vocabulary). Where they are pluralists is at the meta-l vel: They claim that there are 
many different logical consequence relations. In effect, Beall and Restall are pluralists 
about metalogic – attributions of logical truth and logical entailment – but not about logic 
proper. 
15 This view is known as “Plenitudinous Platonism” or “full-blown Platonism”. See 
Balaguer (1998). See Linsky and Zalta (1995) for a rel ted view. 





17 There is a fifth option: The practices in use are so plenitudinous that some community 
was bound to get it right. This is not a promising avenue to explore for two reasons. First, 
it is false that there is a vast plenitude of logical practices in use. Second, even if there 
were many such practices, the proposed explanation  best accounts for the fact that 
someone is reliable. It does not account for the stronger fact that we are reliable. 
18 The relevant background views concern the likelihood f certain outlandish scenarios, 
the a priority of the domain, and the nature of explanation. In particular, they include our 
views about when explanation is necessary and what counts as a satisfying explanation. 
19 There may be logical truths that are not believed on the basis of reasoning. One 
candidate is the Law of the Excluded Middle, since the standard Natural Deduction proof 
of it is less intuitive than the principle itself. 
20 This is a common view. See, for example, Field (2000), Goldman (1986), Pollock and 
Cruz (1999), and Wedgwood (2002). It shouldn’t be pretended that there are no 
obscurities in a rule-based picture of reasoning. See Kripke (1982) and Boghossian 
(1989; 2008) for some of the difficulties. But I am not aware of any alternative picture 
that can do the same work in explaining the nature of asoning. 
21 See Gentzen (1934/1935), page 74. 
22 Harman (1988; 1995), among others, has made a convinci g case that we do not and 
ought not to employ deductive rules as simple as the ones listed. Harman makes the 
further claim that we do not reason with deductive rul s at all. He does not provide 
support for this stronger claim. Moreover, it is intuitively implausible. When we report or 
rehearse our trains of thought, it seems evident that we make use of deductive rules. 
23 There is disagreement in the psychological literature about the correct view of 
deductive reasoning. The view assumed here is closest to that of Rips (1994) and Braine 
and O’Brien (1998). Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991) argue that deductive reasoning is 
based on reasoning with “mental models”. My discussion would only have to be 
minimally changed if this view were adopted. Other psychologists claim that we do not 
employ topic-neutral rules of inference, but only domain-specific reasoning mechanisms. 
See Cheng and Holyoak (1985) and Cosmides (1989) for prominent examples. There are 
reasons to be leery of such a view. Moreover, adopting such a view would not lessen the 
challenge of explaining our reliability about logic. We would have to explain the 
reliability of each of the relevant mechanisms. And there would be the additional 
challenge of explaining how we arrive at general logical truths using only domain 
specific mechanisms. 
24 See Williamson (2008) for an analogous view on which our ability to reason correctly 
about metaphysical necessity and possibility is a byproduct of our more basic ability to 
reason with counterfactuals. See Hill (2006) for a similar proposal. 
25 There is also the related challenge of explaining how it is that we have a cognitive 
mechanism for deductive reasoning with sufficient inferential power to enable us to infer 
a wide range of logical truths. 
26 See Lewis (1986), pages 108–115. It is somewhat difficult to interpret this passage. My 
reconstruction is close to that of Field (1989), page 233. Lewis’s primary interest, of 




27 See Katz (1995), pages 505–506, for a related view. The line of thought is also related 
to what Linnebo (2006) has called the “Boring Explanation”. 
28 Field (1989), pages 233–239, presents several objections to Lewis’s argument. 
29 An answer to an etiological question seems to be what Gibbard (2003), pages 253–258, 
calls a “deep vindication”. 
 As stated, the etiological question is ambiguous. It can be understood as asking a 
question about ontogeny – how it is that the relevant creatures develop a reliable 
mechanism – or about phylogeny – how it is that the mechanism (or the developmental 
plan for it) is prevalent in the relevant population. The latter is the philosophically more 
pressing question. 
 The etiological question may be slightly misnamed. An answer to an etiological 
question need not provide the causal history of the relevant cognitive mechanism. For 
instance, one potential answer to the etiological question about logic is that cognitive 
mechanisms were initially randomly distributed in the population and then some deity 
decided to smite those individuals lacking reliable deductive mechanisms. (I owe this 
example to Jonathan Ichikawa.) Indeed, in the case of a non-objective domain, an answer 
to the etiological question need not provide a causal hi tory at all. For instance, a 
different potential answer to the etiological question is that the facts of the domain are 
constituted by our opinions, and so we would have possessed a reliable cognitive 
mechanism no matter what. In the case of an objective domain, however, it is difficult to 
envision an answer that does not involve some kind of causal story. 
30 This is not to say that there are no interesting empirical questions concerning the 
operation of our cognitive mechanism for deductive inf rence. 
31 Lewis is mistaken in his claim that the relevant dis inction is between necessary and 
contingent domains. There is no quick answer to the operational question for the familiar 
necessary a posteriori truths. More interestingly, there is a quick answer for certain 
contingent truths. For instance, there is a straightforward explanation of how I am reliable 
in my belief that if p obtains then p actually obtains. In general, there is a straightforward 
answer to the operational question in cases where t relevant cognitive method is 
guaranteed to output a truth given true inputs. This may happen even if the content of the 
output varies from world to world due to the presence of an indexical. Thanks to Tim 
Williamson for helpful discussion of this issue. 
32 See Field (1989), pages 26–27. 
33 It is difficult to provide a general account of strikingness. See Horwich (1982) and 
Schlesinger (1991) for attempts. I take it that the most promising proposals are: (i) A 
phenomenon is striking if it can be described using a simple rule; and (ii) A phenomenon 
is striking if there is a salient theory that would predict or explain it. 
34 Thanks to Ralph Wedgwood for pressing this line of th ught. 
35 Here’s a second kind of example: Any contingent fac will logically entail every logical 
truth. But the explanation of a contingent fact will not be an explanation of arbitrary 
logical truths. 
36 This is a modified version of the argument for immodest inductive rules in Lewis 
(1971). Also see Field (2000) and Elga (2010). 




38 There are, however, reasons for doubt. For instance, we should in principle be open to 
arguments for alternative logics. 
39 As Rowland Stout pointed out to me, there is a fourth proposal to consider – namely, 
learning. One way to develop this suggestion is to claim that we acquired our deductive 
competence via trial and error learning. We test logically complex propositions against 
the world (via perception) and use such tests to evaluate the truth-conduciveness of 
proposed deductive rules. The problem with this view is that, while it may provide the 
correct account of some of our deductive reasoning, it is implausible for the core parts of 
deduction. Moreover, even if the proposal were true, it would simply raise another 
explanatory demand. We would have to answer the reliability challenge for our cognitive 
mechanism for trial and error learning. This mechanism could not itself be acquired by 
trial and error learning. In general, if the reliability challenge for a domain is answered by 
appeal to more basic cognitive mechanisms, we can simply raise reliability challenges for 
those mechanisms. 
40 Gödel (1947) may have endorsed a rational insight-based view of mathematics. 
BonJour (1998) endorses a rational insight-based viw of a priori knowledge in general. 
41 See, for instance, Boghossian (2003), pages 230–232. Also see Wright (2004) for 
objections particular to the case of logic. 
42 See Bealer (1996) for the claim that we have intellectual seemings. See Sosa (1996) for 
arguments that these mental states are best understood as dispositions to believe. 
43 My development of this proposal makes use of the work of Bealer (1996; 1999) and 
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